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 Abstract 
 The technology industry is seeing a spike in valuations due to an influx of capital 
to invest in these inefficient markets. Competition, which enforces fair pricing, has 
shifted from between the companies seeking investment to between the investors. 
Investors are tending to pay too much money in order to be able to invest because the 
power is in the hands of the entrepreneur. As a result, the intrinsic value of technology 
companies is misaligned with what they are valued at during the time of an investment. 
The focus of this research is to add objectivity to the valuation of technology companies 
by using the real options method, which hasn’t been applied in the private technology 
markets. I will be using binomial options valuation method to explore the myriad of 
possibilities of investments that are “out-of-the-money” and “in-the-money.” These 
valuations will be compared with their true market value, which will be deduced by their 
post IPO and fund raising value.
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INTRODUCTION 
 This senior thesis paper examines the valuation of unicorn (>$1B valuation) 
technology firms in private markets by using binomial real options pricing. Expanding on 
the real options teachings of Professor Kaul and Professor Damodaran, I study the 
volatility, cash flow, exercise price, capital expenditure, and asset price of 4 key startups 
that went public in 2019. Furthermore, we establish the placement of their funding 
rounds on this timeline and examine the value of an option to invest in the firm and the 
myriad of possibilities of investments that are “out-of-the-money” and “in-the-money.” 
The results of this study will carry broad private/public valuation insights for the 
technology sector. It will help expand our understanding, and limitations, of using 
options pricing to value entire firms. 
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RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Statement and justification of Problem 
Statement of problem 
 The purpose of this research is to bring more information symmetry to the 
technology investing market by creating a fundamental, objective model to value 
technology companies—being able to easily derive a value for the firm instead of pricing 
the value using venture money standards. 
 The buy-side financial markets suffer from severe information asymmetry. 
Venture capital and private equity investment money intended for technology 
companies is oversubscribed, meaning there are too many investors for investment 
firms, and there is too much money for high potential companies. As a result, 
entrepreneurs can choose their investors from a large assortment of offers. This means 
investing in technology companies involves arbitrary pricing decided by the 
entrepreneur. As of late, the intrinsic value of companies eyeing investment is not 
equivalent to valuations in which they are being invested in. It is commonplace to see 
headlines such as “Uber’s IPO Valuation Makes No Sense” (Forbes), “WeWork’s 
downfall shows how ridiculously overvalued so many startups are” (CNN), or “Silicon 
Valley tech bubble is larger than it was in 2000, and the end is coming” (CNBC). 
Investors are not pricing the companies they invest in. They are, instead, pricing against 
other investors to beat them to get the opportunity to invest in said company. 
 Venture and technology investing have changed an incredible amount because 
the hype cycle for technology is at an all time. Nonetheless, technology is extremely 
valuable to invest in, as it is the future of efficiency and optimization. 
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 Venture investing took place in a more selective market between the dotcom 
boom period and the current technology boom. During this in-between period, investors 
were selective with their capital because they had a limited amount of money, and there 
was a smaller amount of companies. They could look at a company fully and value it 
with objectivity to make an informed decision. As a result, the competition was primarily 
between companies seeking investment. 
 
 During boom markets, such as the time we are in now and during the dot come 
bubble, there is an influx of companies, but an even larger influx of capital to invest in 
these companies. As a result, the competition shifts from between companies raising 
money to between investors under pressure from LPs to invest large sums of capital. 
 
 This shift in competition causes investors to overvalue companies because they 
are competing to be able to invest. Because the entrepreneurs have an advantage in 
raising capital, there is a severe misalignment between the intrinsic value of the 
company and the value at which it is invested in. A startup CEO may be thinking… “We 
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have 4 investment offers for us to raise our $4M Series A round. I am going make these 
investors bid against each other so that I get the best deal on my equity”. On the other 
hand, a venture investor may be thinking… “My goal is to provide solid returns to my LP 
investors ASAP, so I will compete with other investors and deploy as much capital as I 
can in companies I believe in.” 
Justification of Problem 
This research problem is important because technology investments are at an 
all-time high, and many “traditional” companies are mutating their financing and 
operations to be similar to those of technology companies. 
US public markets are in a 10-year bull run, which confirms the assumptions that 
there is a misalignment between the intrinsic value of companies and the value at which 
they are invested in. This problem is solvable by using intrinsic valuation methods. We 
often use DCF and comparable methods, but these are challenging to apply to early 
stage companies without other metrics. As a result, there is room for research and 
development of a method to align the value at investment and intrinsic value. This is a 
real problem, and innovation and major capital markets are at stake without providing 
this alignment. 
Literature Review 
 The vast majority of literature focused similarly to this thesis are segmented into 
two categories—technology valuations or options pricing. Technology valuation 
literature is typically focused on improving valuation methods, while options pricing 
literature shows the mathematical operation of options and how to apply them to 
business decision making. 
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Technology valuations 
           In the report, Squaring venture capital valuations with reality, Gornall and 
Strebulaev confirm the above claims of rampant overvaluation of technology firms in the 
private markets. To address these confirms, the authors calculate fair market value for 
all private technology firms valued at over $1B using a combination of discounted cash 
flow (DCF), series of payoffs, and distribution based on share types. Their results 
stated, on average, the 135 unicorn companies in the US were overvalued by roughly 
48%. Many other reports tackle similar questions in the Journal of Business Venturing, 
all generally with a slightly deviated method of applying DCF to technology firms. For 
example, Goedhart discusses in a McKinsey article, Valuing high-tech companies, how 
to create weighted scenarios for technology firm DCFs. Most written reports create a 
feeling of uncertainty around technology investing, which can be solved with enough 
due diligence and trial and error. Additional literature reviewed can be noted in the 
references section and the Thesis Proposal document. 
Real options 
           Options are often written about in two main groupings—industrial application and 
theoretical. On the theoretical side, I’ve reviewed the original Black–Scholes–Merton 
model, but reading these papers I lost sight of the big picture. As a result, I started 
focusing on real options methods. The work in Damodaran’s The Promise and Peril of 
Real Options is integral to this report, and its contents are highlighted in sections below. 
Additionally, I have reviewed Investment Opportunities as Real Options: Getting Started 
on the Numbers by Timothy A. Luehrman in the Harvard Business Review. Building off 
of this first report, he wrote another—Strategy as a Portfolio of Real Options. These 
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guide readers to think in financial terms and of businesses as portfolios of options and 
projects. However, Damodaran’s literature posed more real-world application to valuing 
a company. Nonetheless, no literature on real options directly shows methods to value 
whole firms, the literature simply hints at this possibility. Many other sources discuss 
real options for energy projects, such as Vogstad’s wind energy evaluation. It still points 
out that assumptions, such as volatility, are key and should remain the same whether 
valuing a project, market, or company. I find that that this option quantitative approach 
has been thought about and strategized, but not built for private technology companies. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
Hypothesis 
           It is challenging to initially gauge the value added by applying options pricing—
most likely, it will serve as an augmented view of valuation and forecast. In this case, 
generally, the model will confirm the majority of technology firms are overvalued. 
However, I am predicting that the option value will be relatively high (investing on 
private market), as this option value is driven by exclusivity and inability for everyone to 
participate in private rounds of funding. Additionally, I anticipate the observed 
technology firms to have a far lower capital expenditure per share in perpetuity 
compared to intrinsic valuation, as they are typically not capital intensive businesses. 
Theoretical Framework 
 
           Focusing on technology firm valuation through the lens of options pricing will 
place a particular emphasis on objectivity, volatility, and evaluating intrinsic value versus 
capital expenditures. 
          A real option is embedded in an action if (1) it provides the holder with the right to 
buy or sell a specified quantity of an underlying asset at a fixed price (2) there is a 
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clearly defined underlying asset whose value changes over time in unpredictable ways 
(3) the payoffs on this asset are contingent on a specified event occurring within a finite 
period. 
           A real option has significant economic value when there is a restriction on 
competition in the event of the contingency. In a perfectly competitive market, no 
contingency. An option is most valuable when it has exclusivity—only this particular 
investor can take advantage of the contingency. They become less valuable as barriers 
to competition become less steep. 
           The value can be estimated using an option pricing model if (1) the underlying 
asset is traded (2) there is an active marketplace for the option (3) the cost of exercising 
the option is known with some certainty. Nonetheless, the value estimates will be 
imprecise, as the value can deviate much more than marketplace due to difficulty of 
arbitrage. 
           I will be focusing on binomial options pricing as opposed to the Black Scholes. 
The Binomial Model is a statistical method, while the Black Scholes model requires a 
solution of a stochastic differential equation. There is no significant difference between 
the results of the above two models. Overall, the Binomial model is better for having 
“options” to invest over time and tracking these. 
Applying real options is viable for 3 main reason: (1) Companies in every type of 
industry have to allocate resources to competing opportunities—in existing businesses 
or new ventures. Companies must decide whether to invest now, to take preliminary 
steps reserving the right to invest in the future, or to do nothing. Because each of these 
choices creates a set of payoffs linked to further choices down the line, all management 
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decisions can be thought of in terms of options (2) Options theory is notoriously arcane, 
so people have not thought to apply it to modern technology companies (3) People are 
turned away by the math, so it is underutilized in private market investing. 
 
McKinsey & Co. 
This research area is novel because I am looking into using traditional options 
pricing models to purely calculate the volatility of technology companies. (1) This is 
applying a currently used method (real options) to a new application—modeling the 
volatility of private and public technology companies has not been done before using an 
options pricing model because venture investing shies away from modeling. (2) This is a 
new approach to valuing to technology companies. Applying real options is viable and 
novel. (3) This is replicating the real options method with new data. 
           This new method is viable with enough qualitative and quantitative modeling to 
encompass all aspects of an investment deal. Additionally, there are so many 
companies to invest in now that a model can be validated and should be built to 
compare the many companies available for investment. 
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Methodological Framework 
Conceptual 
           Mathematically, binomial options pricing is simple, but it is challenging applying 
the right lens for yielding assumptions and understanding. 
Variable Meaning Calculation 
S Asset price (stock price) Market-based 
E Exercise price (strike price) Market-based 
u Magnitude of up-jump between nodes 
 
d Magnitude of down-jump between nodes 
 
σ Volatility Market-based 
rf Riskless rate Market-based 
q Probability of up-jump between nodes 
 
qu Probability of down-jump between nodes 𝑞𝑢 = 1 − 𝑞 
t Time between nodes (1 = year) 0.08 (1 month) 
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Investopedia 
 
 
 
Professor Damodaran 
 
Practical 
           The tree and calculations for options pricing remain the same, but the modeling 
must now use intricate, real world inputs and assumptions for asset price, exercise 
price, volatility, and riskless rate. 
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Variable Meaning Calculation Real world 
S Asset price (stock price) Market-based NPV (DCF per 
share basis of 
firm or target 
price projection) 
E Exercise price (strike price) Market-based CapEx of firm in 
with terminal 
value in 
perpetuity 
u Magnitude of up-jump 
between nodes 
 
(math remains 
the same) 
d Magnitude of down-jump 
between nodes 
 
(math remains 
the same) 
σ Volatility Market-based Figures from 
Damodaran’s 
deviation in firm 
value by sector 
rf Riskless rate Market-based Taken from 10 
Year T-Bonds, 
broken up by 
monthly rates 
q Probability of up-jump 
between nodes  
(math remains 
the same) 
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qu Probability of down-jump 
between nodes 
𝑞𝑢 = 1 − 𝑞 (math remains 
the same) 
t Time between nodes (1 = 
year) 
0.08 (1 month) (math remains 
the same) 
 
Asset Price 
           Stock price can be readily found for a publicly traded company, as determined by 
the market. On the other hand, it is difficult to gauge true value of a technology firm in 
the private market due to overvaluation in private rounds and lack of information on 
private firm financials. I, instead, took common assumptions from readily available DCF 
models built at the time of IPO or beginning of 2020 for these various technology firms. 
These are built on the company S1 when filing for an IPO, which reveal the nitty gritty 
financials. 
 
           Following the usual DCF form, the model projects unlevered FCFs (UFCFs) on a 
discount rate, calculates the TV, calculates the enterprise value (EV) by discounting the 
projected UFCFs and TV to net present value, and calculate the equity value by 
subtracting net debt from EV. I then divide this final value by shares outstanding to 
achieve per share intrinsic value. I then use WACC to discount this back to two years 
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prior to the IPO, when it was being invested in on private markets. On the other hand, 
these price outputs can be compared or replaced by the average of stock price targets 
made by analysts to ensure an objective valuation. For example, 
 
 
 
CFI 
 
 
Axial 
Exercise Price 
This exercise price, which can normally viewed as the expenditure needed to attain a 
certain share price can be correlated to the capital expenditure of the firm. Using DCF 
projections, we can project out 5-10 years, and, in the final year of the projection, 
calculate the value of CapEx in perpetuity by dividing it by the WACC less growth rate of 
CapEx. All of these CapEx values are discounted back to 2 years prior to IPO using the 
2017 10 Year T-Bill riskless rate. This cumulative sum can be divided by the total 
number of shares to achieve “CapEx per share”. This will be used as the exercise price 
(strike price). For example, 
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𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐸𝑥 = 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟	𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐸𝑥𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐸𝑥	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
Volatility 
The volatility is integral to this options pricing method because the higher the volatility, 
the greater the opportunity to earn and the larger the up jump between nodes is. At the 
same time, this can also work against an investor’s favor. In order to provide a robust 
volatility figure, I turned to Professor Damodaran’s analysis of volatility by sector (public 
markets). While they are not specifically the same for private markets, the public 
markets will provide a strong correlation. Developing volatility in private markets could 
be another thesis in itself. I calculated a weighted average of volatility based on the 
most relevant 2-3 sectors. For example, 
 
The most relevant sectors and volatility data include: 
Industry Name Number of Firms Std Deviation in Equity Std Deviation in Firm Value E/(D+E) D/(D+E) 
Software 
(Entertainment) 13 49.61% 47.22% 93.94% 6.06% 
Software (Internet) 305 65.60% 63.91% 96.79% 3.21% 
Software (System & 
Application) 255 53.27% 48.04% 87.61% 12.39% 
 
Professor Damodaran 
Riskless Rate 
I used historical riskless rates for 10 Year T-Bills for the riskless rate. For year by year 
calculations I used: 
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For the nodes, which were 1 month apart, I found each historical monthly fluctuation 
and converted it into a monthly rate. For example, 
 
The riskless rate is extremely integral to the entire operation, especially when 
discounting back from end of time. It heavily guides the probability of an up-tick or 
down-tick and ensure that this model is risk neutral. This is a key component courtesy of 
the Fed. 
FRED Graph Observations 
Federal Reserve Economic Data 
Link: https://fred.stlouisfed.org 
Help: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/help-faq 
Economic Research Division 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
  
DGS10 
10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, Percent, Monthly, Not Seasonally 
Adjusted 
  
Frequency: 
Monthly  
observation_date DGS10 
2017-05-01                                2.30  
2017-06-01                                2.19  
2017-07-01                                2.32  
2017-08-01                                2.21  
2017-09-01                                2.20  
2017-10-01                                2.36  
2017-11-01                                2.35  
2017-12-01                                2.40  
2018-01-01                                2.58  
2018-02-01                                2.86  
2018-03-01                                2.84  
2018-04-01                                2.87  
2018-05-01                                2.98  
2018-06-01                                2.91  
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2018-07-01                                2.89  
2018-08-01                                2.89  
2018-09-01                                3.00  
2018-10-01                                3.15  
2018-11-01                                3.12  
2018-12-01                                2.83  
2019-01-01                                2.71  
2019-02-01                                2.68  
2019-03-01                                2.57  
2019-04-01                                2.53  
2019-05-01                                2.40  
 
Data Selection 
The key here is not pumping in a mass amount of data, as the model will inherently be 
miscalculating. The key is to find a few key firms which we can look at closely. I am 
focusing on four companies: 
Company Sector IPO date Post-IPO 
performance 
Uber Consumer software 
& transportation 
May, 2019 Negative 
Slack Enterprise & 
consumer software 
April, 2019 Negative 
Crowdstrike Enterprise software 
& security 
June, 2019 Positive 
Zoom Enterprise & 
consumer software, 
entertainment 
April, 2020 Positive 
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These firms present a unique lens because they were founded in the last 12 years, 
have had massive amounts of venture funding leading to unicorn status, and they have 
gone public in the last year—providing observable results after the market has fairly 
priced each company. Additionally, each firm is in a differing sector within technology to 
provide some breadth. For each of these firms, we will be utilizing their S1 filing, 10K 
reports, projections, and DCF assumptions. 
 
Quartz 
In addition to the post IPO data, we will be looking into private round funding, dividing by 
total shares, to see the price per share during the late rounds of funding. We can then 
place these share prices on the binomial tree to test for trends. For example, 
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RESULTS 
Uber 
Assumptions 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance 
Out-of-the-money option on model’s first date, May 1st, 2017:  
$            40  
($1) 
 
 20 
 
Adarsh Rachmale 
For the following tree graphs, red denotes out of the money options, and yellow denotes 
where fundraising or IPO at that time valued the share. 
 
 
Recombination line and below are out of the money. 
Slack 
Assumptions 
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Performance 
High value option on May 1st, 2017:  
$            21  
$15  
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Crowdstrike 
Assumptions 
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Performance 
High in the money option value on May 1st, 2017:  
$            64  
$47  
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Zoom 
Assumptions 
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Performance 
High in-the-money option value on May 1st, 2017: 
$            65  
$54  
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DISCUSSION 
Results Discussion 
           The above results can be further viewed in the attached model. This model 
changed the way I think about investing. It is truly challenging to truly discern the 
results, as they are purely based on projections and terminal values, but a useful 
exercise. We can see that a high CapEx can bring down a company’s value, such as 
Uber. On the other hand, Crowdstrike and Zoom had very little CapEx per share, and it 
makes their shares in-the-money. Each firm’s prior to IPO investment rounds were at or 
below the recombination line, besides Uber. Uber’s pre-IPO investment erred above the 
line, and even its recombination line was out of the money options. A good gauge of 
CapEx and taking on the company as an opportunity is using this model and seeing the 
number of cells that are out-of-the-money—the number of out of the money possibilities 
given such a high CapEx. On the other hand, an optimistic model can greatly reduce 
these by pumping up the DCF per share value. Additionally, discounting back using 
WACC from 2020 pricate target found that funding rounds were relatively close to those 
targets. As a result, it is difficult to test the overvaluation (as stated in hypothesis) 
different than a normal method of observing post-IPO fair value. Overvaluation is 
inherently baked into the model via intrinsic value. 
Limitations 
DCF valuation 
           Using widely accepted price targets and DCF assumptions made this exercise 
more objective, but they were ultimately made when the company was not private. The 
model has two more years of data. Making a DCF for a private company is extremely 
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challenging. So, using these assumptions in 2020 I discounted back to 2017 using 
WACC. It turns out that this was accurate to the funding rounds, but likely inaccurate to 
the models built by the VCs. 
Total shares 
           The total number of shares fluctuates for each of these firms. For example, Slack 
doubled its shares outstanding this year. Additionally, there are varying types and 
preferences of stocks that are given to early, late, and public investors which can greatly 
change payouts and values. The early investors could be getting better preference, but 
this was not evaluated here. 
Capital Expenditure 
           It is challenging to understand the meaning of CapEx to a technology firm. It is 
something that is associated with traditional businesses and investment opportunities, 
such as mining or launching a new product, etc. On the contrary, technology firms look 
to intrinsic and intangible value. It is difficult to correlate CapEx to this, as something 
could take minimal CapEx and disrupt an industry—this is the whole goal of tech 
venture investing. 
Volatility 
Public market deviation in firm value is very different from private market, A smaller, 
private startup will always be more risky. Correlating public to private market volatility is 
a sizeable jump. The up-jumps and down-jumps will likely be a lot greater in magnitude. 
Areas of Future Inquiry 
           In the future, it would be interesting to build multiple DCFs dating back to two 
years prior to IPO, input all share preferences, calculate private market volatility for 
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each firm. With these components, the model would be more accurate. Additionally, this 
model could be applied to many more companies to provide a data set of options 
pricings in private market. This precedence can be used by VCs to value potential 
investment. I’d also just be interested in analyzing all technology firm’s CapEx per 
share. 
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CONCLUSION 
 There are a few key takeaways: 
(1) VCs have high option values because of their exclusivity in investing 
(2) CapEx is very important (CapEx per share is a uniquely important metric) 
(3) DCFs and price targets are highly biased, but they are the core to valuation 
(4) Volatility is key and rives higher returns 
(5) Modeling will rarely produce a definite, accurate results 
While investors may not directly use this guide to invest, it is a useful tool to have 
in the background. More data means more alignment of valuations. In the end, the 
financials are important, but what is more important is the means in which I create the 
model and the ideas behind it. 
 My final recommendation is that this model will be excellent to be used as a 
football field graph alongside an investment proposal or model. It can give a new insight 
on the option to invest in a company. It also gives an eye into the operator’s 
perspective. It emphasizes value and capital needed to attain said value. 
Thank you 
 This was an amazing experience reading literature, building this model, and 
learning from my thesis advisor (Professor Gautam Kaul). Thank you so much for this 
opportunity! This mode of thinking will carry on with me and be an essential tool in my 
technology and business pursuits. 
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